Short-run price performance of venture capital trust in initial public offerings by Yang, Tianna et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Short-run price performance of venture capital trust in initial
public offerings
Citation for published version:
Yang, T, Hou, W & Li, P 2018, 'Short-run price performance of venture capital trust in initial public offerings'
Finance Research Letters, vol. 25, pp. 177-182. DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2017.10.016
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1016/j.frl.2017.10.016
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Finance Research Letters
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
1 
 
 
Short-run price performance of venture capital trust in initial public 
offerings 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the short-run price performance of venture capital trust (VCT) initial 
public offerings (IPOs). We find a very small positive first-day market-adjusted average 
abnormal return of 0.056% for VCT IPOs. This positive return is non-existent at the end of 
the seventh and twenty-first trading days. The abnormal returns for VCT IPOs are much 
smaller than those for non-financial IPOs over the sample period. Furthermore, we find no 
trading activities in the short-run aftermarket of VCTs.  
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1. Introduction 
Entrepreneurs promote economic growth through innovation and competition (Wennekers 
and Thurik, 1999). However, financing constraints are one of the biggest concerns impacting 
entrepreneurs around the world (Kerr and Nanda, 2009). While mature companies turn to the 
stock market to raise debt or equity capital, very small companies usually rely on capital from 
the founders and often face financial constraints. Various approaches are taken by the 
governments in different countries to provide finance for entrepreneurs. For example, 
Shanghai government issued a regulation in January 2016 that the government would 
compensate the loss of venture capital and the compensation is up to around 6 million RMB. 
UK government offers tax reliefs for the investors of venture capital trusts (VCTs). The 
introduction of VCTs, a form of publicly traded private equity listed on the London Stock 
Exchange, through the legislation of the UK Finance Act 1995, was a practical policy 
response to a perceived “capital gap”, aiming to provide sufficient risk capital to smaller and 
younger UK companies with growth potential (Cumming, 2003; Cumming and Johan, 2013; 
Cumming and MacIntosh, 2007; Hayley, 2016; Hou and Yang, 2017). This study examines 
their short-run price performance in initial public offerings (IPOs).  
By the end of June 2017, more than 280 VCTs had been floated on the London Stock 
Exchange’s Main Market, with a market value of about £2100 million. David Hall, the 
managing director of YFM Equity Partners, suggested that Brexit may benefit VCTs schemes 
because the rules governing VCTs would be no longer influenced by European Union. He 
expected that greater freedom and a relaxation of the rules could be one of the one of the 
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opportunities that Brexit might bring1. Despite the importance of VCTs as an asset class, VCT 
IPOs remain under-researched. The most prominent characteristic of VCTs is that their 
individual investors can obtain a high rate of income tax relief if they buy VCT shares at the 
initial public offering (IPO) and continue to hold them for a minimum required period. If an 
individual investor invested £5000 in new VCT issues on 7th May 2005, he would have 
received £2000 in income tax relief if he had held the shares for three years. In addition to the 
income tax savings, the investor receives the majority of the returns as tax-free dividends 
during the life of the VCT. As indicated by Cumming and MacIntosh (2006), funds such as 
VCTs and LSIFs are expected to have higher agency costs and lower profitability than private 
venture capital funds. Therefore, to obtain the tax benefits from investing in VCTs, investors 
need to be able to afford the long-term investment risk and high agency costs.  
The literature documents significantly high abnormal returns for non-financial issuing 
companies around the world in the short-run aftermarket (see Aggarwal, 2003; Bradley and 
Jordan, 2002; Derrien and Womack, 2002; Field and Sheehan, 2004; Loughran and Ritter, 
2002; Ritter and Welch, 2002). Investors normally expect high abnormal returns when they 
rush to purchase non-financial IPO shares. AIC (2016) suggests that VCTs are continuously 
being expanded and are highly likely to continue to boost the UK economy by providing vital 
finance and expertise to smaller British companies and stimulating high levels of job creation. 
It is essential that investors wishing to make substantial profits from flipping IPO shares 
identify whether VCT IPOs are a good choice. It is also important that investors intending to 
obtain tax benefits by purchasing VCT IPO shares confirm whether taking on the high 
                                                             
1 Link: https://www.ftadviser.com/investments/2017/02/16/brexit-may-benefit-venture-capital-trust-schemes/ 
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investment risk and agency costs rather than flipping shares is worthwhile. All of the above 
motivate us to investigate how VCT IPOs perform in the short-run aftermarket.   
VCT IPO offerings are not underwritten and all the risk is borne by the issuers. Sponsors 
play a very limited role in the VCT floating process. The offer price of a non-financial firm is 
usually determined by the company’s directors and their financial advisers. In comparison, 
most VCT IPOs have the same offer price of 100p, which may be due to the inability to value 
new VCT shares.  
Due to the significant differences in pricing, the floating process, policy and structure, 
between VCTs and non-financial firms, we can predict that both the price performance and 
the trading activity of VCT IPOs in the short-run aftermarket should differ from those of 
non-financial issuing companies. Are there any flipping activities for VCT IPOs? Can VCT 
investors receive a first-day bonus at the end of the first trading day? To find these answers, 
we investigate the returns and trading for our sample of VCT IPOs at the end of their first, 
seventh and twenty-first days of trading in the short run. This study provides enlightenment 
for investors buying new shares in VCTs. In particular, the results help show whether VCTs 
represent a good choice for investors looking for initial high returns.  
2. Data and Sample 
This paper uses 285 VCT IPOs quoted on the London Stock Exchange’s Main Market from 
the first launching period of April 1995 to June 2017. To perform a comparative analysis, we 
also use the sample of 337 non-financial UK IPOs on London’s Main Market from the same 
period. Our main source of data is the Datastream online service. Other sources are the 
London Stock Exchange website, KPMG New Issue Statistics and individual offer 
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prospectuses from Thomson One Banker. Most VCTs are very small, with a market value of 
no more than £10 million, and only 8 VCTs have market values larger than £30 million.  
 We divide all IPOs into two categories: non-financial and financial. The population of 285 
VCT IPOs accounts for 37.849% of all financial IPOs. The years 2005 and 2006 contribute a 
large proportion of our sample. By contrast, the smallest contribution came in 2003, when 
there was only one new VCT. Before 2004, VCT IPOs offered investors the ability to defer a 
capital gains tax liability, a 20% income tax rebate on their initial investment and no tax to 
pay on income or gains from the trust. In April 2004, the capital gains tax deferral was 
scrapped, while the income tax rebate was increased to 40%. Demand soared as a result and 
new offerings during the 2005 and 2006 tax years were the highest yet for VCTs. Nevertheless, 
as the 40% income tax rebate cost the Treasury around £490 million, it came as no surprise 
when the Chancellor announced that, from 6th April 2006, the income tax rebate would fall to 
30%, the minimum holding period would increase from three to five years and the size of 
VCT investee companies would be further limited. As a result, VCT demand declined in 2007 
and continued to do so after that.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
3. Empirical Results 
We analyse the market-adjusted returns using the HGSC Index as a market benchmark, and 
later use the FT Small Cap Index as an alternative to test the robustness of the results. The 
results of using the HGSC Index benchmark are presented in Table 2.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
The average returns on the first trading day for the sample of non-financial IPOs are 
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6.253%, and the returns on the seventh trading day increase to 8.843% and further to 9.562% 
on the twenty-first day of trading. All these abnormal returns are statistically significant at the 
1% level and the associated relative wealth results are all larger than one. In comparison, for 
the sample of 285 VCT IPOs, the abnormal mean returns fall from 0.056% for the first trading 
day, to -0.412% for the twenty-first. Only the abnormal return on the first trading day is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The small positive abnormal return on the first trading 
day disappears in the short run for VCT IPOs.  
Table 2 shows that the tendency for positive skewness in the individual return distributions 
is alleviated in the distributions of differences. Therefore, the results of the difference tests are 
convincing. For the difference-of-means t-test, we use a one-sided upper-tailed alternative 
hypothesis that the mean returns of non-financial issuing companies are larger than those of 
VCT IPOs. For the difference-of-medians test, we apply the Mann-Whitney U test and use a 
one-sided upper-tailed alternative hypothesis that the median abnormal returns of 
non-financial IPOs are larger than those of VCT IPOs. The results strongly support these two 
alternative hypotheses, and the difference between the short-run abnormal returns of VCT 
IPOs and non-financial IPOs is strongly statistically significant.  
In a nutshell, the results solve the first research question for this paper. That is, in the 
short-run aftermarket, the average abnormal returns for VCT IPOs are much smaller than 
those for non-financial IPOs, and the small positive returns of VCT IPOs on the first trading 
day are short lived and are non-existent at the close of both the seventh and twenty-first 
trading days.  
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
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In Table 3, the 285 VCT IPOs are divided into 23 small groups by issue year. We use the 
HGSC Index as a benchmark to calculate the average abnormal returns and the associated 
t-statistics for each group of VCT IPOs. We find significantly positive average abnormal 
returns of 0.355% at the end of the first trading day for the VCT group in 2010. In most other 
issue years, VCTs produce negative abnormal returns on the first trading day. Thus, the VCTs 
listed in 2010 may be the reason for the initial positive returns for the whole sample of VCT 
IPOs.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
In Table 4, we divide the VCT sample into four groups by size and compare their short-run 
price performance. Here, we only analyze the returns that are statistically significantly 
different from zero. Among these four groups, the VCTs with a market value smaller than £10 
million clearly produce the largest average abnormal returns of 0.157% at the end of the first 
trading day.  
Finally, we test the effect of investment policy on the price performance of VCT IPOs. 
Since the investment policy is reflected by the AIC sector classification, we divide the VCTs 
into 11 small groups according to their AIC sector. In untabulated tests, we found VCTs in the 
sectors of Generalist pre-qualifying and Specialist in Media pre-qualifying to be most likely 
to contribute to the initial positive abnormal returns for the whole sample of VCT IPOs at the 
end of the first trading day. In particular, VCTs in the Media pre-qualifying sector performed 
best of all the sectors at the close of the first trading day. None of the sectors out-performed 
the market over either of the following two short-run time horizons (seventh and twenty-first 
trading days). This is consistent with the findings for the whole VCT sample.  
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The results obtained using the FT Small Cap Index as an alternative benchmark were 
qualitatively identical to the results in Tables 2, 3 and 4 and the untabulated tests. Thus, the 
estimated returns described above are all robust to the choice of benchmark.  
We also found that none of the VCTs had any trading activity from the first day to one 
month after being listed. By contrast, most of the non-financial IPOs had large trading 
volumes in the immediate aftermarket, even lasting for a few days. Therefore, the short-run 
trading activity of VCT IPOs is quite different from that of non-financial IPOs, and the 
secondary market for VCT IPOs is really very illiquid.  
On the one hand, the initial positive average returns for VCT IPOs at the end of the first 
trading day are only 0.056%, which is much smaller than the 30% income tax relief. 
Therefore, a rational investor is unlikely to forgo the tax benefits in exchange for just the 
0.056% initial returns by flipping the VCT IPOs. That means there is no motivation to sell in 
the immediate aftermarket. On the other hand, the high income tax relief provided by VCTs 
only applies to the purchase of new shares and not to investors who buy VCT shares in the 
secondary market. As a result, there is no motivation to buy in the immediate aftermarket.  
4. Conclusions 
This is the first study to provide evidence of the short-run price performance of VCT IPOs. 
We document significantly positive abnormal returns of 0.056% on the first day of trading for 
VCT IPOs, but the positive returns are non-existent at the end of both the seventh and 
twenty-first trading days. The abnormal returns for VCT IPOs are much smaller than those for 
non-financial IPOs over all three short-run time horizons. Moreover, most non-financial IPOs 
have high trading volumes in the first few trading days. However, we find no trading in VCT 
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IPOs in the short-run aftermarket. This means there is no flipping activity in VCT IPOs. To 
conclude, most theories explaining the anomalies of non-financial IPOs are not applicable to 
VCT IPOs. VCT IPOs do not offer a first-day bonus or short-run profits, and investors who 
are looking for short-run profits should focus on non-financial issuing companies. VCT IPOs 
will be of interest to investors wishing to take advantage of the tax benefits or to make 
long-term investments. The results provide implications for the short-run price performance 
of similar kinds of private equity schemes such as the Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) in 
the UK and the venture capital limited partnership in the US, and also give suggestions to the 
UK government regarding legislative changes to VCTs, and even regarding the decision over 
whether or not to continue expanding the volume of VCTs.  
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Table 1: UK IPOs on the London Stock Exchange’s Main Market by year of issue 
Year All IPOs 
All non-financial 
IPOs 
All financial IPOs 
   VCT IPOs 
VCTs and other 
financial IPOs 
Proportion of 
VCTs (%) 
1995 28 15 2 13 15.385% 
1996 36 18 9 18 50.000% 
1997 22 11 6 11 54.545% 
1998 64 35 10 29 34.483% 
1999 70 21 7 49 14.286% 
2000 125 59 17 66 25.758% 
2001 82 6 23 76 30.263% 
2002 40 12 4 28 14.286% 
2003 17 5 1 12 8.333% 
2004 44 16 11 28 39.286% 
2005 75 15 29 60 48.333% 
2006 74 17 33 57 57.895% 
2007 59 16 21 43 48.837% 
2008 33 3 19 30 63.333% 
2009 20 1 15 19 78.947% 
2010 45 10 18 35 51.429% 
2011 34 5 23 29 79.310% 
2012 29 4 15 25 60.000% 
2013 34 9 6 25 24.000% 
2014 51 23 4 28 14.286% 
2015 56 20 7 36 19.444% 
2016 28 10 4 18 22.222% 
2017 24 6 1 18 5.556% 
12 
 
Total 1090 337 285 753 37.849% 
Mean 47.391 14.652 12.391 32.739 37.401% 
S.D. 25.605 12.445 9.164 17.902 22.221% 
Note: All IPOs include all UK issuing companies in all sectors on the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange from April 1995  
to June 2017. All non-financial IPOs + all financial IPOs = all IPOs; VCT IPOs constitute the population of VCT IPOs from April 1995  
to June 2017. VCTs and other financial IPOs is the population of IPOs in all financial sectors. Proportion of VCTs is the proportion of  
VCT IPOs in the entire population of financial IPOs. 
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Table 2: Abnormal returns on IPOs (HGSC benchmark) 
 
Note: The sample mean abnormal return of itMAAR is calculated using the following steps: (1) 1)/( 0  iitit PPR , where Pit is the price of stock i, Pi0 is the offer price of stock i 
and Rit is the raw return of stock i. (2) 
1)/( 0  mmtmt PPR , where Pmt is the market index value of each stock i and Pm0 is the market index value on the offer day of each stock. 
Rmt is the comparable market return. (3) 
  1)1/(1100  mtitit RRMAAR . (4) 



N
i
itit MAARNMAAR
1
/1
. T-statistic of t-test is for a two-sided alternative hypothesis that the 
mean return is different from zero. Difference-of-mean t-statistic is for a one-sided upper-tailed alternative hypothesis that the mean return of non-financial IPOs is larger 
than that of VCT IPOs. Mann-Whitney U statistic is for a one-sided upper-tailed alternative hypothesis that the median return of non-financial IPOs is larger than that of 
VCT IPOs. Wealth relative is computed as: 



N
i
mt
N
i
itt RNRNWR
11
)/11/()/11(
. *** and * stand for statistical significance at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. Results using 
FT Small Cap Index as a benchmark were qualitatively identical. 
 
   
HGSC benchmark 
        1st trading day       7th trading day      21st trading day 
Non-financial 
IPOs (n=337) 
VCT IPOs 
(n=285) 
Non-financial 
IPOs (n=337) 
VCT IPOs 
(n=285) 
Non-financial 
IPOs (n=337) 
VCT IPOs 
(n=285) 
itMAAR  (%) 
6.253 0.056 8.843 -0.032   9.562 -0.412 
T-statistic  ***7.346 **2.403 ***4.835 -0.093 ***7.148 -0.780 
Median (%) 3.370 -0.080 4.762 -0.734 5.023 -1.497 
Maximum (%) 45.180 10.651 116.826 11.922 115.892 14.723 
Minimum (%) -12.982 -7.117 -12.811 -15.524 -31.112 -18.138 
Skewness 0.689 1.778 8.060 1.016 6.002 0.376 
Kurtosis 10.38536 21.094 8.684 8.241 7.985 4.216 
Dmean t-statistic  *** 6.931 *** 3.345 *** 3.824 
Dmedian U statistic  *** 3.180 *** 4.505 *** 4.597 
tWR  
1.047 1.003 1.086 0.996 1.088 0.993 
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Table 3: Abnormal returns on VCT IPOs by year of issue (HGSC benchmark) 
Panel A:               
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 n=2 n=9 n=6 n=10 n=7 n=17 n=23 n=4 n=1 n=11 n=29 n=33 n=21 n=19 
 1st trading day  
1iMAAR (%) 
-0.180 0.000 -0.139 -0.694 1.037 0.226 0.035 0.232   -0.183 -0.126  0.085 -0.468 -0.001 0.848 
t-statistic -1.816 0.000 ***-6.526 -1.435 0.798 0.176 0.193 0.629 0.000 -1.230 0.834 ***-5.757 -0.004 1.682 
 7th trading day 
7iMAAR (%) 
1.327 -0.465 -0.485 -1.939 0.656 4.970 -0.213 1.840 1.300 -0.374 0.041 -2.046 -0.004 1.847 
t-statistic 1.171 -0.571 ***-9.711 **-2.482 0.236 1.718 -0.236 1.539 0.000 -0.838 0.110 *** -3.872 0.733 0.811 
21st trading day 
21iMAAR (%) 
-0.397 -4.943 0.471 -2.148 0.583 7.332 1.229 2.134 6.952 -2.556 -0.636 -3.143 0.272 3.082 
t-statistic -0.265 ***-5.300 1.309 ** -2.936 0.450 **2.514 0.580 1.329 0.000 ***-5.605 -0.857 ***-5.012 0.180 1.221 
               
Panel B:               
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017      
 n=15 n=18 n=23 n=15 n=6 n=4 n=7 n=4 n=1      
1st trading day 
1iMAAR (%) 
0.304 0.355 -0.135 0.216 0.127 -0.906 0.629 -0.634 -0.373      
t-statistic 0.551 **2.852 -0.423 0.703 0.844 -0.917 1.215 -0.473 0.000      
7th trading day 
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7iMAAR (%) 
-5.745 -0.525 0.354 1.436 0.809 1.201 1.235 0.998 0.950      
t-statistic ***-4.842 -0.832 0.298 1.391 0.606 1.642 1.418 1.304 0.000      
21st trading day 
21iMAAR (%) 
-13.167 -1.472 3.154 3.011 -1.573 -1.550 -1.711 -0.999 -2.050      
t-statistic ***-5.876 -1.418 1.014 **2.748 -1.081 -1.102 -1.042 -0.894 0.000      
Note: This table divides the 285 VCTs into 23 groups according to their issue year to compare the short-run mean abnormal returns between different groups. ***, ** and * 
indicate that the mean return is statistically significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively (two-tailed t-test; degrees of freedom = 
n-1). Results using FT Small Cap benchmark were qualitatively identical. 
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Table 4: Abnormal returns on VCT IPOs by size (HGSC benchmark) 
 
Size (MV) 0-10 million 10-20 million 20-30 million above 30 million 
 n=223 n=48 n=6 n=8 
1st trading day 
1iMAAR (%) 
0.157 0.026 -0.955 -1.821 
t-statistic    **2.068  0.105 -1.726   -1.021 
7th trading day 
7iMAAR (%) 
0.168 -1.171 -2.209 2.860 
t-statistic 0.519   -0.943      -1.608 0.939 
21st trading day 
21iMAAR (%) 
-0.171 -1.675 0.628 -0.332 
t-statistic -0.312 -0.968 0.124 -0.125 
Note: VCT size is measured by market value. This table divides VCTs with information on market value available into four  
groups according to their size, to examine whether the size of VCTs has an impact on their short-run abnormal returns. * and *** indicate 
that the mean return is statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% and 1% level respectively (two-tailed t-test; degrees  
of freedom = n-1). Results using FT Small Cap benchmark were qualitatively identical.  
 
 
 
